The Bangladesh Sustainability Compact: an effective exercise of global experimentalist EU governance? by Kenner, Jeff & Peake, Katrina
This article has been published in a revised form in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.3. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for 
re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of 
Cambridge 
1 
 
The Bangladesh Sustainability Compact:  
An Effective Exercise of Global Experimentalist EU 
Governance? 
Jeff KENNER and Katrina PEAKE* 
 
Abstract 
The calamitous Rana Plaza factory collapse in 2013 focused international attention on 
labour rights’ violations and factory safety in Bangladesh’s dominant ready-made garment 
industry which is almost wholly dependent on exports to the EU. In response, the EU and 
the ILO launched the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact, with the core objective of 
promoting continuous improvement in labour rights and factory safety in the industry. 
The uniqueness of the Compact stems from its nature as a form of experimentalist 
governance involving both governmental and non-governmental actors. Being primarily 
an EU-led initiative based on balancing trade, sustainable development and human rights’ 
objectives, it is underpinned by the possible option, if the Compact fails, of withdrawing 
trade preferences. This article will examine the rationale for the Compact, its main 
features, and its effectiveness as a form of ‘global experimentalist governance’. 
Keywords: labour rights, trade, sustainable development, European Union, Bangladesh, 
Compact, ready-made garments, global experimentalist governance 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission once posed the rhetorical question, ‘it is surely unacceptable for the 
international community to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the name of trade 
liberalisation?’1 Embracing a wealth of debate over the connection between the social dimension of 
globalisation and the pursuit of free trade,2 the EU has been asking itself this question over many 
                                                          
* Jeff Kenner is Professor of European Law at the University of Nottingham; Katrina Peake is a Midlands3Cities Doctoral Researcher at the 
University of Nottingham. This article further develops research by the authors in a case study published for the EU FP7 project FRAME 
(Fostering Human Rights among European policies): M Ark, M Islam, J Kenner, B Lein, K Peake, ‘The Integration of EU development, trade 
and human rights policies’, FRAME Work Package No 9 Deliverable No 4 (Commission, 1 September 2016) <http://www.fp7-
frame.eu/frame-reps-9-4/> (“FRAME Deliverable 9.4”). 
1 Commission, ‘The Trading System and Internationally Recognised Labour Standards’, COM(96) 402 final, p 16. 
2 See O De Schutter, Trade in the Service of Sustainable Development (Hart Publishing, 2015); VA Leary and D Warner (eds), Social Issues, 
Globalisation and International Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006); B Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Hart Publishing 
2005); S Charnovitz, Trade Law and Global Governance (Cameron May, 2002); Y Dahan et al (eds), Global Justice and International Labour 
Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2016); A Chan and RJS Ross, ‘Racing to the Bottom: International Trade Without a Social Clause’ (2003) 
24(6) Third World Quarterly 1011. 
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decades.3 Nevertheless, the EU’s actions, addressing this question, have been limited and it has still 
not found an adequate method to address this complex connection.4 The EU was obliged to react, 
however, when the Rana Plaza factory complex near Dhaka collapsed on 24 April 2013. In the worst 
industrial disaster of the 21st century, to date, over 1,136 people died and over 2,535 suffered serious 
injuries.5 Most were young women working on the production of ready-made garments (RMGs) for 
export, mainly to the EU. The victims had been instructed to work for fear of loss of wages despite 
compelling evidence that the building was unsafe.6 The tragedy was wholly avoidable and has been 
summed up aptly by Jeremy Seabrook as ‘a story of such appalling contempt for human life that it must 
rank among the most callous in the brutal history of industrialism’.7 It was Rana Plaza, which followed 
on from a series of fatal factory fires,8 that finally put the denial of labour rights and dangerous factory 
conditions in Bangladesh’s RMG industry under the global spotlight.  
The EU as Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, with RMGs accounting for 90% of the country’s 
exports to the Union,9 was duty bound, morally, legally and normatively, to act. Morally, the 
international community looked to the Union for some action of ‘moral generosity’10 that would 
address the negative effects of trade liberalisation that it had, in part, been facilitated by means of 
tariff preferences. Legally, withdrawal of tariff preferences upon ‘serious and systematic violations’ of 
human rights, including violations of certain International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, listed 
as conditions under the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP),11 had to be considered as a 
real possibility. Normatively, as an international standard-setter,12 the EU had an imperative to act in 
a manner that would demonstrate its influence and effectiveness as a global actor. 
 In response, the Union concluded the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact (the Compact), a soft 
law initiative supported by the ILO, alongside several different actors, including the US (and later 
Canada), domestic and international trade union and employer organisations, and the Government of 
Bangladesh.13 The uniqueness of the Compact stems from its nature as a tailored form of ‘global 
                                                          
3 See note 1 above, p 16; P Alston (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999); Commission, ‘The Social Dimension of 
Globalisation – The EU’s Policy Contribution on Extending the Benefits to All’, COM(2004) 383 final. 
4 Commission, ‘Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance in the Context of Globalisation’, COM(2001) 416 final, p 
13. 
5 KG Moazzem and A Islam, ‘Moving Beyond the Shadow of the Rana Plaza Tragedy: In Search of a Closure and Restructuring Strategy’ 
(Fourth Monitoring Report, Centre for Policy Dialogue Bangladesh, 21 April 2015) 6 <http://cpd.org.bd/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Fourth-Monitoring-Report-Rana-Plaza-Tragedy-FINAL-April-2015.pdf> 
6 J Seabrook, The Song of the Shirt (Hurst & Company, 2015) p 21. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Just a few months earlier, 112 garment workers had perished in a fire at the Tazreen Fashions factory. See Seabrook, ibid. 
9 Delegation of the EU to Bangladesh, ‘Trade and Investment’ 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/bangladesh/eu_bangladesh/trade/index_en.htm>  
10 BA Langille, ‘Seeking Post-Seattle Clarity – and Inspiration’ in J Conaghan et al, Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative 
Practices and Possibilities (Oxford University Press, 2002) p 139. 
11 Commission Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 [2012] OJ L 303 (“GSP Regulation”), Chap V.  
12 See I Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40(2) JCMS 235. 
13 Commission, ‘Staying Engaged: A Sustainability Compact for Continuous Improvement in Labour Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-
Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh’ (Joint Statement) p 2 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151601.pdf> (“The Bangladesh Sustainability Compact”) 
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experimentalist governance’ (GXG) tested by the EU.14 The Compact reflects support for 
experimentalist governance implicit in the EU’s legal and policy framework governing its external 
relations. Indeed, it may provide a blueprint for future EU interventions designed to provide solutions 
to complex interactions between trade, sustainable development and human rights’ considerations in 
bilateral or multilateral relations. However, concerns have been raised as to the Compact’s 
effectiveness, and its nature as a form of GXG must be assessed to ascertain its capacity for positively 
affecting labour rights and conditions in Bangladesh’s RMG industry. 
 This article will first define experimentalist governance and, next, explore the potential of the 
broader concept of GXG in the sphere of the EU’s external relations, before embarking on a case study 
of the Compact, to determine its effectiveness, as a GXG method, for the EU to exert its leverage in 
trade to promote sustainable development and continuous improvement in labour rights in 
Bangladesh’s RMG industry. 
II. DEFINING EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE 
‘Experimentalist governance’ is a term deployed to describe a typology of governance that differs from 
the norm. ‘Governance’ refers to features such as an integrated network of public and private actors 
and the deterioration of distinctions between hard and soft law.15 It may also encompass flexible, less 
prescriptive, and less hierarchical-types of regulatory approaches to governance.16 The involvement of 
actors other than classically governmental actors, both private and third sector, is one of its core 
features.17 Experimentalist governance can be applied to processes and practices that are of a 
normative nature yet cannot be related to the traditional governmental ‘command-and-control-type 
legal institutions’.18 The ‘experimentalist’ element of the term can be defined as processes and 
practices that instigate doubt about the assumptions and practices of governance, the solutions of 
which are thought incomplete and able to be readjusted through the comparison of different 
approaches to advancing similar aims.19 Reduced to its core ‘experimentalist’ nature, it constitutes a 
typology of governance that constitutes a particular method of achieving certain goals by putting it to 
the test to collect, ultimately, outcome samples of its success or failure. 
 The concept of ‘EU experimentalist governance’, coined by Sabel and Zeitlin, embodies several 
features.20 These are: firstly, framework goals and measures that are established by joint action of the 
                                                          
14 G de Búrca, RO Keohane and C Sabel, ‘Global Experimentalist Governance’ (2014) 44 BJPolS 477, p 478. 
15 C Möllers, ‘European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 313, p 322. 
16 G de Búrca and J Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 2.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 J Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Originally Published H Holt 1927, Swallow Press 1991) as cited in J Zeitlin, Transnational 
Transformations of Governance (Amsterdam University Press, 2011) p 7. 
20 CF Sabel and J Zeitlin (ed), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (Oxford University Press, 
2010) p 3. 
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Member States and the EU institutions; secondly, that lower-level units have the freedom to meet 
these goals as they see fit; thirdly, these units report regularly on performance and participate in a 
peer review; and fourthly, framework goals and procedures are periodically revised by the actors who 
initially established them.21 This form of experimentalist governance is applied to the internal structure 
of EU policy making. Nevertheless, it has become clear that experimentalist governance also has an 
external dimension. Indeed, its attractiveness has led to its application both transnationally by the EU 
and,22 to a degree, globally.23 As a form of policy making, it is increasingly recognised as a legitimate 
and advantageous method of pursuing external aims and objectives.  
The term ‘global experimentalist governance’24 (GXG), as developed by De Búrca, Keohane and 
Sabel, constitutes: firstly, an initial reflection and discussion among stakeholders over a common 
problem; secondly, the articulation of a framework understanding with open-ended goals; thirdly, the 
implementation of goals is left to lower-level or contextually situated actors with knowledge of local 
conditions; fourthly, there is continuous feedback from local contexts; and fifthly, the goals and 
practices are periodically and routinely re-evaluated and where possible revised.25 GXG may also take 
place in the shadow of ‘penalty default’,26 which underpins this form of governance in a scenario of 
non-cooperation, in accordance with De Búrca and Scott’s default hybridity thesis.27 In essence, this 
thesis underpins experimentalist governance with the ‘shadow of the law’ whereby the legal rules 
represent the default regime that can be applied for the purpose of forcing a particular action.28 
 Many of the features of experimentalist governance and GXG are similar. In both, for example, 
the actors involved know the outcomes that are desired but the path to obtaining these outcomes is 
blurred.29  Such forms of governance are endowed with a number of advantages, being suitable for, 
and facilitating, diverse, provisional and revisable decision making, transparency and policy learning, 
and participation and cooperation across a range of relevant stakeholders.30 
III. EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
Experimentalist governance is supported within the EU’s external relations, particularly the fields of 
trade, sustainable development and human rights, by a number of factors, including: ‘spillover’ from 
internal experimentalist governance processes and practices; legal foundation in the Treaties and 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 Examples of transnational regulation include the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Forest Law Enforcement 
Governance and Trade Initiative, and the EU’s role in shaping the transnational regulation of GMOs, see J Zeitlin (ed), Extending 
Experimentalist Governance? The European Union and Transnational Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2015).  
23 Examples of GXG include the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention, see note 14 above, p 478. 
24 See note 14 above. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See note 16 above, p 9.  
28 Ibid.  
29 See note 14 above, p 479. 
30 See note 16 above, p 3.  
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policies pertaining to external action; close relations with international organisations that share policy 
objectives, such as the ILO; integration of non-governmental actors within trade instruments; and, the 
global context of fulfilling the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
a. Experimentalist Spillover 
The EU’s pursuit of experimentalist governance within its external relations is represented by the term 
‘experimentalist spillover’. In the field of labour law, experimentalist spillover has occurred as the EU 
adopts increasingly novel methods to develop and implement laws,31 involving both public and private 
actors, including the social partners - trade unions and employers’ organisations - in the design of laws 
and policies.32 Experimentalist spillover also aligns with ‘normative spillover’33 as the EU externalises 
human rights protection and norms, including sustainable development, worldwide. These varying 
concepts of spillover stem from neofunctionalism, a theory put forward to explain the European 
integration process whereby integration in one policy area will lead rapidly to integration in other 
policy areas.34 As such, as the thrust of integration creates a domino effect as governance tools 
adopted internally are pursued externally. This endorses GXG as an effective mechanism for the EU to 
promote its standards as a ‘normative actor’.35   
b. Experimentalist Governance as supported within EU 
External Relations Law and Policy 
The endorsement of experimentalist governance as a mechanism of governance within the EU’s acquis 
is evident. Ambitions of multilateralism and engagement with actors beyond traditional ‘command-
and-control-type’ governmental institutions are mandated within Article 21(1) TEU on the principles 
of external action. With a domineering tone, this provision states that the EU ‘shall seek to develop 
relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global 
organisations’36 which share principles pertaining to, inter alia, ‘the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’. It bolsters the founding of the Union on ‘respect for human 
rights’ (Article 2 TEU) and its mandate to uphold and protect its values, including sustainable 
development (Article 21(2) TEU), in its relations with the ‘wider world’ (Article 3(5) TEU). This mandate 
is generated from Articles 207(1) and 208(1) TFEU pertaining, respectively, to the Common 
Commercial Policy and Development Cooperation, which underpin Union policies in these areas with 
                                                          
31 The concept can also be applied to other areas of external EU experimentalist governance.  
32 C Kilpatrick, ‘New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU 
and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 135.  
33 M González Garibay, ‘The Trade-Labour Linkage from the Eyes of Developing Countries: A Euphemism for Protectionist Practices? (2009) 
5 European Foreign Affairs Review 763. 
34 B Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) p 2. 
35 See note 12 above. 
36 Emphasis added. 
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human rights values. Human rights are deemed the ‘silver thread’ that runs through EU external 
action.37  
Discernibly, the Union is a ‘staunch defender’ of human rights both internally and externally.38 
Labour rights falling within the broad domain of economic, social and cultural rights are put, at least 
notionally, on the same footing as civil and political rights under the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. However, despite its normative ambitions as a human rights defender, the Union lacks policies 
that are consistent and coherent in the field of trade and labour rights.39 Yet, as there is the scope for 
norm transfer as the EU conducts trade,40 it is a potentially lucrative field through which to promote 
labour rights rooted in ILO obligations shared with partner countries.  
Trade and labour rights became a focus for the EU in the 1990s after the failure, at WTO level, 
to integrate international trade and labour standards.41 In turn, this led the EU to design an ‘ambitious’ 
agenda for promoting labour rights through trade.42 This agenda rejects protectionist or sanction-
based approaches, which might lead to disputes before the WTO, in favour of the pursuit of integrated, 
multi-disciplinary methods.43 The EU seeks to promote incentive, dialogue and cooperation-based 
approaches to fostering labour rights, incorporating civil society, including domestic and international 
social partners.44 Through this inclusive method, the EU aims to act broadly by collective means,45 
facilitating social dialogue,46 and supporting regular review of progress towards set targets, and 
promoting feedback and learning.47 The EU also conducts a significant proportion of external activities 
within multilateral global governance fora.48  
c. The EU-ILO Relationship 
Fundamentally, the EU-ILO relationship is intrinsic to any policy approach that is focused on improving 
labour rights in countries which, as ILO members, are signatories of the 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and committed to ratification of core ILO conventions.49 
                                                          
37 Commission, ‘Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a More Effective Approach’, COM(2011) 886 
final. 
38 P Alston and JHH Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever-Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’ in P Alston 
(ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 1999) p 6. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See note 12 above, p 245. 
41 See B Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Hart Publishing, 2005). 
42 B Kerremans and J Orbie, ‘The Social Dimension of European Union Trade Policies’ (2009) 14 European Foreign Affairs Review 629, p 632. 
43 See note 4 above, p 13. 
44 See note 38 above, p 11; Commission, ‘Promoting Decent Work for All: The EU Contribution to the Implementation of the Decent Work 
Agenda in the World’, COM(2006) 249 final, p 10. 
45 G De Búrca, ‘EU External Relations: The Governance Mode of Foreign Policy’ in B Van Vooren et al (eds), The EU’s Role in Global 
Governance: The Legal Dimension (Oxford University Press, 2013) p 42. 
46 Commission, ‘Promoting Decent Work for All’, note 44 above, p 10. 
47 Commission, ‘A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development After, 2015’, COM(2015) 44 final, p 3. 
48 J Wouters et al, ‘The European Union’s Participation in United Nations Human Rights and Environmental Governance: Key Concepts and 
Major Challenges’ in J Wouters et al (eds), The European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing the EU Participation in United 
Nations Human Rights and Environmental Fora (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) p 3. 
49 Adopted by the International Labour Conference at its Eighty-sixth Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998 (Annex revised 15 June 2010) 
<http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm> 
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The relationship between the EU and the ILO is not an asymmetric one.50 The EU supports the ILO 
internally, by encouraging its Member States to ratify ILO conventions and approve recommendations, 
and externally through policy and normative measures.51 From 2004 the relationship has deepened, 
out of a shared desire to promote the social dimension of globalisation, through the establishment of 
a ‘strategic partnership’ under which the EU plays a lead role in promoting the ILO programme for 
‘decent work’ through joint development cooperation initiatives.52 The concept of decent work 
encompasses job creation, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue, with gender equality 
as a crosscutting objective.53 Decent work now forms part of Goal 8 of the UN’s 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda. Decent work is, however, ‘merely a singular thread among a complex web of 
issues that provide the dynamic of EU international relations’,54 making it even more important that 
labour rights are strengthened not by the EU acting alone but rather through mutually reinforcing EU-
ILO strategies.55 The ILO is ‘exceedingly relevant’ for ensuring that the Union’s normative goals are 
consistent with international obligations.56 
Support for ILO norms now forms a core element of EU trade policy and instruments. The EU’s 
capacity to act normatively comes from supporting international labour law as opposed to 
transnationally exporting its internal labour law, the direct impact of which on third countries is 
limited,57 and would, if attempted, be subject to strong resistance. Thus, the standards set by the ILO 
represent a source of normative power for the EU when applying its trade leverage.58 The Conventions 
set what the standard should be and ratification shows a commitment to achieve it.59 In summary, the 
EU’s promotion of labour rights reflects the concept of ‘ILO-isation’, which comprises an increasing 
emphasis on the ILO’s role in setting and monitoring labour standards, a shift towards soft governance, 
and a growing responsibility for the private sector in applying principles in ILO Conventions.60 The EU-
ILO relationship, therefore, is a centrifuge around within which support for GXG is spun. 
d. The Integration of Non-Governmental Actors within EU 
Trade Instruments 
                                                          
50 A Johnson, ‘EU-ILO Relations: Between Regional and Global Governance’ in J Orbie and L Tortell (eds), The European Union and the Social 
Dimension of Globalization: How the EU Influences the World (Routledge, 2009) p 92. 
51 Ibid p 94. 
52 Commission and ILO, ‘Concerning the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the international Labour Organisation and the 
Commission of the European Communities in the field of Development’ (Memorandum of Understanding, 2004) A.1. 
53 ILO, ‘Decent Work Agenda’ < http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm> 
54 J Kenner, ‘Economic Partnership Agreements: Enhancing the Labour Dimension of Global Governance?’ in Van Vooren et al, note 45 
above, p 321. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See note 50 above, p 93. 
57 J Orbie and O Babarinde, ‘The Social Dimension of Globalization and EU Development Policy: Promoting Core Labour Standards and 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2008) 30(3) European Integration 459. 
58 R Kissack, ‘Writing a New Normative Standard? EU Member States and ILO Conventions’ in Orbie and Tortell, note 50 above, pp 101-102. 
59 Ibid. 
60 J Orbie et al, ‘EU Trade Policy and a Social Clause: A Question of Competences?’ (2005) 17 Politique Européenne 159, pp 166-168.  
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The EU’s trade instruments increasingly integrate non-governmental actors. Unilateral GSP 
instruments and bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have, as they have evolved, 
increasingly orientated themselves around local, regional and international stakeholders.61 More 
recent initiatives have been concluded built on the premises of dialogue and cooperation, including 
the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact. The objective is to harness the EU’s trade and development 
policies to promote decent work and adherence to, at least, the core ILO conventions, the essence of 
which demands collaboration, coherency and consistency,62 all of which can potentially be provided 
within GXG. 
Correspondingly, there has been a shift from ‘government’ to more inclusive new forms of 
governance within these trade instruments, even in long-established trade instruments such as the 
GSP. In the GSP, the procedure for tariff preference withdrawal by the EU - negative conditionality - 
overwhelmingly relies on ILO decisions and actions against that country where it is deemed to have 
seriously and systematically violated labour rights.63 ILO country assessments and evaluations form the 
starting point for the EU’s assessment of the potential application of negative conditionality 
measures.64 Other actors are relied upon within this process, including the WTO, the OECD, 
international trade unions and employers’ organisations.65 As such, the EU mainstreams a collaborative 
approach to GSP withdrawal in specific instances of violations.66 GSP negative conditionality is not, 
therefore, as ‘hard’ or as unilateral as it might seem. 
 Elements of newer governance methods are also evident in the EU’s ‘new generation’ FTAs,67 
whereupon there has been both a deepening of the labour provisions customarily incorporated into 
such agreements and a widening of oversight.68 Here, sustainable development clauses (SDCs) include 
provisions regarding labour rights, through which the EU is attempting to foster ILO commitments,69 
that enable the participation of civil society in discussions relating to their implementation.70 The EU’s 
insistence on the use of SDCs has caused controversy and slowed some FTA negotiations, for example, 
with India, because the EU’s support for labour rights through trade is still seen through a protectionist 
lens by many partner countries. Experimentalist governance may help to overcome the disinclination 
                                                          
61 See note 47 above, p 15. 
62 Commission, ‘Promoting Decent Work for All’, note 44 above, p 10. 
63 GSP Regulation, Article 19; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1083/2013 [2013] OJ L293/16; See note 1 above, p 14; C Portela 
and J Orbie, ‘Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and Foreign Policy: Coherence by Accident?’ (2014) 20(1) 
Contemporary Politics 63. 
64 See note 60 above, p 167.  
65 See note 1 above, p 14. 
66 See O De Schutter, note 2 above, Chapter 4. 
67 The new generation FTAs are those recently concluded by the EU which include provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development, see 
Commission, ‘Trade: Sustainable Development’ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/sustainable-development/index_en.htm> 
68 L Van den Putte and J Orbie, ‘EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour Provisions’ (2015) 31(3) The International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 263, p 264. 
69 J Orbie and S Khorana, ‘Normative Versus Market Power Europe? The EU-India Trade Agreement’ (2015) 13 Asia Eur J 253, p 260.  
70 See J Orbie et al, ‘Civil Society Meetings in European Union Trade Agreements: Features, Purposes and Evaluation’ (CLEER Papers 
2016/3). 
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of trade partners towards the mix of EU trade, sustainable development and labour rights. Moreover, 
where previously human rights clauses acted either as a sword, forcing third countries to comply with 
human rights obligations in return for single market access, or as a shield, allowing the EU to revoke 
trade benefits,71 new style SDCs, by contrast, go beyond these functions. SDCs act as an impetus for 
experimentalist governance and the basis for a multifarious and heuristic approach to addressing 
labour rights violations which may more successfully promote the social dimension of globalisation as 
opposed to the unilateral and punitive approach of GSP withdrawal.72 Increased engagement with non-
state actors has fostered an integrated, multi-disciplinary approach by the EU to trade and labour 
rights.73 
e. The Global Context of the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals 
Experimentalist governance is further supported within the framework of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The shift in 2015 from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the 
SDGs was designed to promote multi-stakeholder engagement.74 As part of this agenda, the EU has 
sought to facilitate a new global partnership with a spirit of solidarity and cooperation.75 The EU pushes 
for multi-stakeholder partnerships that include private actors and civil society,76 with key GXG 
components of monitoring, accountability and review.77  Sustainable development has thus become a 
further factor emphasising the need for the Union to orientate towards experimentalist governance. 
It has become not only a ‘buzz phrase’ that promotes the political consensus to include labour 
provisions in trade and sustainable development instruments,78 but also the SDGs are an overarching 
reference point to ensure the incorporation of civil society within trade and labour rights’ issues.79 
f. Summary 
Experimentalist governance responds to the current global context and its dynamic challenges and 
opportunities.80 The global and EU-level framework encouraging GXG enables countries to maximise 
progress towards attaining the SDGs and facilitates the adoption of EU trade instruments that are not 
sanctions-based, enabling the EU to reap the benefits of experimentalist methods in attaining certain 
                                                          
71 L Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford University Press, 2005) pp 175-176. 
72 Commission, ‘Policy Coherence for Development: Accelerating Progress Towards Attaining the Millennium Development Goals’, 
COM(2005) 134 final, p 5. 
73 See note 4 above, p 13. 
74 N Shawki, ‘Norm Evaluation and Change: Analysing the Negotiation of the Sustainable Development Goals’ in N Shawki (ed), 
International Norms, Normative Change, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Lexington Books, 2016) p 9. 
75 See note 47 above, p 3. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid p 14. 
78 See note 68 above, p 282. 
79 FRAME Deliverable 9.4, p 22. 
80 Commission, ‘A Decent Life for All: Ending Poverty and Giving the World a Sustainable Future’, COM(2013) 92 final, p 3. 
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normative goals. The Bangladesh Sustainability Compact is the epitome of EU GXG and is a suitable 
case for analysis.  
IV. A CASE STUDY OF GLOBAL EXPERIMENTALIST EU GOVERNANCE 
a. Labour rights’ issues in the Ready Made Garment Sector 
in Bangladesh – the case for EU external governance 
In this case study we have selected labour rights’ issues in the RMG industry in Bangladesh because of 
the intense interaction between trade, development and human rights issues focused on a specific 
sector in a country which is economically dependent upon exports to the EU’s single market.81 The EU, 
therefore, has considerable leverage, through its external governance instruments and processes, to 
influence policy and practice on the ground to facilitate improvements in labour conditions. 
The case for the exercise of global EU governance in the field of labour rights in Bangladesh is 
threefold. Firstly, with 47 million out of 161 million people living in poverty,82 Bangladesh is a priority 
for the EU in its development cooperation,83 as it seeks to contribute to the eradication of global 
poverty and the fulfilment of the SDGs by 2030.84 Bangladesh is a long-standing development partner 
of the EU, and has faced the evolution of EU policy from being first a ‘donor’ and now a partner with 
Government and civil society focused on development needs, governance and human rights.85 Under 
the EU’s Agenda for Change, the Union seeks to tailor its development partnerships so as to achieve 
the greatest ‘impact’ towards eradicating poverty, or aid effectiveness,86 supporting the twin 
objectives of: promoting human rights and democracy, and other elements of good governance; and 
attaining inclusive and sustainable growth for human development.87 Aid effectiveness has improved 
under partnership and cooperation agreements, modernised financial instruments and mechanisms 
designed to improve policy coherence for development.88  
Partnership with Bangladesh is under the umbrella of the Cooperation Agreement of 2001,89 
which underpins cooperation with respect for human rights and democratic principles.90 The EU uses 
policy dialogue and links results to specific cooperation programmes or instruments.91 Bangladesh is a 
                                                          
81 This section draws on the authors’ contribution to FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 5-6. See pp 12-29 of the report for the broader political and 
socio-economic context post Bangladesh’s independence in 1971; and pp 27-35 for an overview of the development of the RMG sector. 
82 World Bank, ‘Bangladesh Overview’ (2015) <www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview>   
83 See FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 60-67. 
84 UN, ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (2015) <www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html>  
85 See M Rahman and S Rahman, ‘Bangladesh-EU Development Relationship: Major Features and Emerging Issues’ (5 CPD Occasional Paper 
Series, Centre for Policy Dialogue 2000) p 3 <http://www.cpd.org.bd/pub_attach/op5.pdf>; and L Bartels, ‘The trade and development 
policy of the European Union’ [2007] European Journal of International Law 715. 
86 Commission, ‘Increasing the Impact of EU development Policy: An Agenda for Change’, COM(2011) 637 final, p 3.  
87 Ibid 7. 
88 Commission, Green Paper, ‘EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development: Increasing the impact of 
EU development policy’, COM(2010) 629 final, p 3. 
89 Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on partnership and development 
[2001] L 118/48. 
90 Ibid, Article 1. 
91 See note 88 above, p 3. 
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beneficiary of a €690 million country-specific allocation under the Development Cooperation 
Instrument.92 The EU encourages sustainable economic and social development, but challenges 
remain, including youth unemployment, shrinking space for civil society and violence against women.93 
Corruption and political influence are obstacles to securing safe working conditions and genuinely 
effective labour rights’ reforms.94 Employers and trade unions are controlled by party patronage.95 
The ILO’s decent work agenda has become a core part of the EU’s development priorities, 
shifting the focus of the Union’s activities towards improving labour rights and working conditions.96 
In Bangladesh, the Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) 2012-2015 has been the main 
instrument for carrying out this agenda.97 Progress under the DWCP is linked to the specific action the 
ILO is taking in the RMG sector under the Better Work Programme, a partnership between the ILO and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), designed to improve conditions and promote 
competitiveness in the global garment industry.98 
Secondly, under EU trade policy,99 Bangladesh, as one of the UN’s designated Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), is a beneficiary of the Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement under the EU’s GSP, 
granting LDCs full duty and quota free access to the single market for all products except arms and 
ammunition.100 The EBA trade preference has contributed to making the EU the country’s largest 
trading partner.101 Among the 49 EBA qualifying countries, Bangladesh is overwhelmingly the main 
beneficiary, accounting for a staggering 69.1% of all EBA preferential imports into the EU in 2014.102 
The EBA is regarded as important as, in theory, its generous tariff advantages promote the volume of 
trade and thus export earnings and in turn should reduce poverty.103 A significant feature of the EBA is 
the prospect of negative conditionality in the form of temporary withdrawal of preferences where the 
EU is satisfied that there have been ‘serious and systematic violations’ of rights contained in core UN 
and ILO conventions.104 The prospect of imposing this penalty, which would be catastrophic for the 
                                                          
92 European External Action Service and Commission, ‘Development Cooperation Instrument Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2014-
2020’ (30 March 2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mip-bangladesh-2014-2020_en.pdf>  
93 Ibid point 1.2.     
94 J Yap, ‘One step forward: The European Union Generalised System of Preferences and labour rights in the garment industry in 
Bangladesh’ in J Wouters et al (eds), Global Governance through Trade: EU Policies and Approaches (Edward Elgar 2015) pp 214-244. 
95 H Zafarullah, ‘Globalisation, State and Politics in Bangladesh: Implications for Democratic Governance’ (2003) 26(3) Journal of South 
Asian Studies 283, pp 283-296. 
96 See note 86 above, p 7. 
97 ILO, ‘Bangladesh: Decent Work Country Programme 2012-2015’ (November 2012) 
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/dwcp/download/bangladesh.pdf>  
98 Commission, ‘Bangladesh Sustainability Compact: Technical Status Report’ (July 2016) p 7 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/august/tradoc_154841.pdf>  
99 For fuller analysis of Bangladesh-EU trade relations and the GSP, see FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 53-60. 
100 GSP Regulation, recital 16. 
101 The EU received 47% of Bangladesh’s total exports in 2015. The next largest export market was the US with 14%: Commission, 
‘European Union, Trade in goods with Bangladesh’ (21 June 2016) p 8 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113349.pdf>   
102 Commission, ‘Report on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2014-2015’, COM(2016) 29 final, p 8. These exports 
were valued at €11,774,829,000. 
103 GM Grossman and AO Sykes, ‘A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP’ in GM Grossman and AO Sykes, WTO Law 
and Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 255, p 274. 
104 GSP Regulation, Article 19(1)(a). 
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RMG sector and the Bangladeshi economy as a whole, has given the EU considerable leverage over the 
Compact.  
Thirdly, 90% of Bangladesh’s exports to the EU are from a single economic sector, RMGs.105 
Over the last 25 years Bangladesh has rapidly expanded its RMG industry to meet the ever-growing 
demands of global brands seeking high quality and low cost through their ‘global value chains’ 
(GVCs),106 to provide cheap clothes to predominantly European consumers mainly using local sub-
contractors.107 As such, the RMG industry is part of a complex global jigsaw and provides a fascinating 
study of the impact of globalisation on both workers and consumers. GVCs make it particularly difficult 
for countries focused on one export industry at the lower end of the value chain, such as Bangladesh, 
to escape from a cycle of dependency on low-cost labour and low skills.108  
However, with the RMG industry as an economic and social driver, Bangladesh has been 
transformed, meeting several of the MDG 2015 targets for, inter alia, cutting extreme poverty and 
hunger and achieving almost universal primary education.109 It has fuelled economic growth of 6% per 
annum over the last decade.110 The sector employs 4 million workers,111 approximately 85% of whom 
are women.112 Evidence points to increasing school enrolment, decreasing child marriage rates and 
more financial independence for women.113 Yet much more needs to be done to empower women and 
combat exploitative practices.114  
The rapid growth of the industry has been a ‘double-edged sword’ for RMG workers,115 
enabling employers to exploit the country’s comparative advantage in global trade by maintaining the 
second lowest wages among its competitors.116 Indeed, the RMG sector in Bangladesh is characterised 
                                                          
105 See note 9 above. 
106 See G Gereffi and K Fernandez-Stark, ‘Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer’ (Center on Globalization Governance and Competitiveness, 
May 2011) p 5 <http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-05-31_GVC_analysis_a_primer.pdf>  
107 On subcontracting see FRAME Deliverable 9.4, p 33; S Labowitz and D Baumann-Pauly, ‘Business as Usual is Not an Option: Supply 
Chains and Sourcing after Rana Plaza’ (NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, New York, April 2014) p 17 
<http://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/about/departments-centers-initiatives/centers-of-research/business-human-
rights/activities/supply-chains-sourcing-after-rana-plaza>  
108 K Fernandez-Stark, S Frederick and G Gereffi, ‘The Apparel Global Value Chain: Economic Upgrading and Workforce Development’ (Duke 
Center on Globalization, Governance and Competitiveness, November 2011) p 2 <http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2011-11-
11_CGGC_Apparel-Global-Value-Chain.pdf> 
109 UNDP, ‘Millennium Development Goals: Bangladesh Progress Report’ (September 2015) 
<http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/library/mdg/mdg-progress-report-2015.html>  
110 World Bank, ‘Bangladesh’<http://data.worldbank.org/country/Bangladesh>  
111 Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), ‘Trade Information’ 
<http://bgmea.com.bd/home/pages/TradeInformation>   
112 MH Rahman and SA Siddiqui, ‘Female RMG Worker: Economic Contribution in Bangladesh’ (2015) 5(9) International Journal of Scientific 
and Research Publications 1. 
113 World Bank, ‘Getting to Equal, Promoting Gender Equality through Human Development’ (2011) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099080014368/Getting_to_equal.pdf> 
114 N Hussain, ‘Exports, Equity, and Empowerment: The Effects of Readymade Garments Manufacturing Employment on Gender Equality in 
Bangladesh’ (World Development Report 2012) <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-
1299699968583/7786210-1322671773271/Hossain-Export-Equity-employment.pdf>,  
115 ActionAid, ‘Diversify and Conquer: transforming Bangladesh into an industrialised country’ (December 2015) p 4 
<https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/diversify-and-conquer-transforming-bangladesh-into-an-industrialised-
country.pdf> 
116 Bangladesh has a minimum wage of €68 per month ahead of Sri Lanka at €66 per month, ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 
‘Global Wage Report 2014/15: Asia and the Pacific Supplement’, (December 2014) p 3 <www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-
bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_325219.pdf>   
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by long working hours, short and infrequent rest breaks, low wages, job insecurity, gender inequality 
and child labour.117 Freedom of association and a lack of collective bargaining rights are of particular 
concern. Only 10% of the 4,500 garment factories in Bangladesh have registered unions,118 and the law 
mandates excessive registration procedures.119 An ILO high-level tripartite mission highlighted that 
unions may be ‘fake, paper-based, organised without workers’ support, initiated by employers or 
dissolved’.120 The right to form trade unions is further supressed by harassment and abuse faced by 
union members from factory owners, women being particularly vulnerable.121  
Rapid growth has also encouraged speedy construction of factories, often without permits,122 
leading to poor labour conditions, overcrowding, and exposure to noise and dangerous machinery.123 
Factories may also be constructed with extra floors illegally added, as in the case of Rana Plaza,124 or 
have been adapted from residential buildings.125 Many workers lack sufficient training in essential 
health and safety understanding.126 Factory owners face competitive pressure to keep costs low, which 
further undermines their ‘ability to invest in safety’.127 
These interconnected labour rights’ issues, alongside the need for, firstly, greater civil society 
involvement to support trade unions and hold institutions and private actors to account,128 and 
secondly, more responsible business conduct,129 has provided a reference point for the Compact. In 
the following two sections we will first provide a contextual overview of the Compact before turning 
to an assessment of its features as an instrument of GXG. 
b. The Bangladesh Sustainability Compact in Context  
All of the above reasons would have made the Bangladesh RMG sector suitable for a case study on the 
integration of the EU’s policies on development and trade with human rights’ objectives before the 
collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory complex which finally focus the world’s attention on the 
contrast between, on the one hand, liberalised trade and rapid economic growth in Bangladesh and, 
                                                          
117 RD Mariani and F Valenti, ‘Working conditions in the Bangladeshi garment sector: Social dialogue and compliance’ (Delft University of 
Technology and Fair Wear Foundation 2013) <http://www3.fairwear.org/ul/cms/fck-
uploaded/documents/countrystudies/bangladesh/WorkingconditionsintheBangladeshigarmentsectorSocialdialogueandcompliance.pdf>  
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 ILO, ‘Report of the High-Level Tripartite Mission to Bangladesh’ (17-20 April 2016) p 5 <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_488339.pdf> 
121 Human Rights Watch, ‘Bangladesh: Protect Garment Workers’ Rights’ (6 February 2016) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/06/bangladesh-protect-garment-workers-rights>  
122 See note 6 above, pp 33-36. 
123 European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, ‘Occupational safety and health in the textiles sector’ (E-facts, 2 April 2008) 
<https://osha.europa.eu/en/publications/e-facts/efact30/view>; B Bowden, ‘Commentary – Bangladesh Clothing Factory Fires: The Way 
Forward’ (2014) 1(2) South Asian Journal of Human Resources Management 283, p 285. 
124 E D’Ambrogio, ‘Workers' conditions in the textile and clothing sector: just an Asian affair? Issues at stake after the Rana Plaza tragedy’, 
Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service (August 2014). 
125 Ibid. 
126 SA Iqbal et al, ‘Identification of occupational injury among the workers of selected cement industries in Bangladesh - A case study’ 
(2010) 25 Journal of Chemical Engineering 22.  
127 B Claeson, ‘Deadly Secrets: What companies know about dangerous workplaces and why exposing the truth can save workers’ lives in 
Bangladesh and Beyond’ (International Labor Rights Forum, Washington D.C. 2012) p 20. 
128 See FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 49-53. 
129 Ibid pp 45-49. 
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on the other hand, low pay, poor labour conditions and inadequate factory safety.130  The Rana Plaza 
factory collapse also came just a few months after a tragic fire at the Tazreen Fashions factory near 
Dhaka, which left 112 dead. These disasters focused international attention on workers’ rights and 
working conditions in the RMG industry in Bangladesh and other competitor countries. Global actors 
were compelled to respond to demands for immediate action from international trade unions, NGOs, 
civil society organisations and consumers concerned about the ethics behind cheap clothing. The 
message was clear, ‘business could not continue as usual’131 without fundamental changes to safety, 
inspection, improvements in pay and working conditions, and compliance with international labour 
standards. 
Undoubtedly, however, it is the EU, as Bangladesh’s largest export market for RMG products, 
facilitated by its trade preferences, that has had a particular responsibility post Rana Plaza to ensure 
that it utilises its trade and development leverage, and the range of tools at its disposal, to demand 
significant improvements in labour rights and working conditions from the Government of Bangladesh 
and factory owners, and responsible business conduct from global brands and retailers. In the 
aftermath of Rana Plaza, Bangladesh has provided a key test case for the EU, with the levers at its 
disposal, including both soft law and normative power, to demonstrate that its human rights response 
is both purposeful and efficacious. 
There has been no single consolidated action plan in response to Rana Plaza. Instead, there 
have been a series of inter-related public and private initiatives involving different actors, with the ILO 
playing the pivotal role as both coordinator and collaborator with key partners, and with significant EU 
input. On a national level, the National Tripartite Plan of Action (NTPA) is a Government of Bangladesh 
initiative with the social partners, backed up by the ILO, with input from the EU and its Member 
States.132  Global trade unions drove the adoption of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety,133 a ground 
breaking legally binding agreement with global brands, and also the less ambitious business-led 
Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety,134 both of which are private initiatives to improve health and 
safety in garment factories through a continuing process of inspection and remediation. The ILO’s 
Better Work Programme also has a key role in improving working conditions and promoting decent 
work.135 These initiatives overlap in their objectives, and coordination between all the relevant actors 
                                                          
130 Ibid p 8.  
131 ILO, ‘Improving working conditions in the ready made garment industry: Progress and achievements’ (September 2016) 
<http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Whatwedo/Projects/WCMS_240343/lang--en/index.htm> 
132 ILO, ‘National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural Integrity in the Ready-Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh’ (25 July 
2013) <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-dhaka/documents/genericdocument/wcms_221543.pdf> 
see, FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 68-70. 
133 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh <http://bangladeshaccord.org/> see, FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 71-74. 
134 The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety <http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/who-we-are/about-the-alliance> see, FRAME 
Deliverable 9.4, pp 74-75. 
135 See note 131 above; FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 75-76. 
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involved in them is vital to fostering the needed changes. The EU is linked to them all through the 
overarching Compact with its specific focus on broad, ongoing engagement to secure implementation 
of human rights priorities.  
Each of these initiatives is important and innovative, but the Compact136 is the most novel and 
far-reaching in its ambitions. It is a cross-cutting coordinating mechanism that assesses technical 
progress towards the fulfilment of human rights objectives on the ground in Bangladesh’s RMG 
sector.137 The EU issued the Compact in July 2013, in partnership with the ILO and the Government of 
Bangladesh, with the aim of fostering ‘continuous improvements’ in labour rights and factory safety in 
the country’s RMG industry.138 The Compact represents a choice by the EU to reject, at least for the 
time being, the option of withdrawal of the GSP, and instead to embark on a ‘period of deep 
engagement for all actors involved in the global value chain’, including global buyers, brands, 
governments, employers’ and workers’ organisations, and consumers.139 Although the US withdrew its 
GSP post Rana Plaza, it too joined later in 2013 and Canada is a partner from 2016.140  
‘Staying engaged’ was both a pragmatic and economic choice for the EU,141 given the 
importance of the RMG industry for European firms, but it was also in line with ILO thinking, to ‘stay 
with Bangladesh’ so as to protect the millions of jobs that depend on the sector.142 Together, the EU 
and ILO would use their leverage to send a message to the Government of Bangladesh, the domestic 
garment manufacturers and the global brands that change was needed to prevent any further 
disasters. The Compact covers three specific areas, each of which has a strong human rights 
dimension:143  
 respect for labour rights, in particular freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining;  
 structural integrity of buildings and occupational health and safety; and  
 responsible business conduct by all stakeholders.  
We have analysed progress on the commitments made by the partners in each of these areas 
in depth in our report for the FRAME project.144 Our conclusions can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, in respect of labour rights, where the main obligations fall on the Government of 
Bangladesh, with the EU and the ILO providing technical support, there has been an improved 
                                                          
136 Compact, p 3; See, FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 81-91. 
137 ILO, ‘Strengthening Workplace Safety and Labour Rights in the Bangladesh Ready-Made Garment Sector’ (September 2016) p 6 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-dhaka/documents/publication/wcms_474048.pdf>  
138 Compact, p 3. It also covers the knitwear industry. 
139 Commission, ‘Joint Statement by EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht and Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dr Dipu Moni following 
recent disasters in the Bangladeshi garment industry’ (Press Release, 28 May 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
469_en.htm>  
140 See note 98 above, p 2. 
141 The Governments of the EU Member States were represented by the Commission. 
142 See note 137 above, p 6.  
143 Compact, p 2.  
144 FRAME Deliverable 9.4, pp 83-90. 
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legislative environment. The Bangladesh Labour Act was revised in 2013, bringing some improvements 
in relation to freedom of association, collective bargaining and workplace safety.145 The implementing 
rules for the Act were issued in 2015, providing guidance on central elements of the law. However, this 
legislation falls short of ILO standards.146 In our findings, we also identify the need for greater attention 
to be given to the issue of gender equality as part of the review process. 
Lack of freedom of association remains a significant problem. The EU, on the recommendation 
of the ILO supervisory bodies, has urged the Bangladeshi authorities to speed up registrations of trade 
unions and end arbitrary non-registration.147 The global unions have reported that a ‘severe climate of 
anti-union violence prevails’ often directed by factory managers and rarely investigated.148 The ILO is 
also placing increasing pressure on Bangladesh. In June 2015, the Committee on the Application of 
Standards demanded: firstly, strengthening of the legislation in relation to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining; secondly, extending full freedom of association to the 400,000 workers in 
designated Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which are subject to lighter regulation and where trade 
unions are banned;149 and, thirdly, an investigation into all acts of anti-union discrimination to ensure 
reinstatement of those illegally dismissed and the imposition of fines and criminal sanctions on those 
responsible for the violence.150  
Secondly, with regard to health and safety, the priority is to inspect factories, draw up 
Corrective Action Plans and carry out remediation alongside ongoing training. The responsibility for 
securing the objectives under this pillar lie with the Government, under the NTPA, and the private 
actors, the Accord and Alliance, linked to their obligations under the third pillar. Overall, the 2016 
Technical Status Report notes ‘tangible improvements’ in enhancing building and workplace safety.151 
All factories identified as ‘export-orientated’ have been inspected and followed up.152 As the ILO has 
noted, the completion of the factory inspections is an ‘important step’ towards improving safety in the 
sector but ‘no factory can be considered safe until it has successfully undergone a remediation 
process’.153 It is in securing this essential objective that the Compact has a particular role, through 
engagement, in urging remediation of faults in factories.154 The major barrier here is the cost of 
                                                          
145 See note 98 above. 
146 ITUC, UNI global union and IndustriaALL, ‘An Evaluation of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact: March 2015 Update’ (July 2014) p 2 
<http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc-ia-uni_evaulation_of_the_bangladesh_sustainability_compact.pdf> 
147 See note 98 above, p 4. 
148 ITUC, UNI Global Union and IndustriALL, ‘An Evaluation of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact’ (January 2016) p 1 
<http://admin.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Bangladesh/ituc-ia-
uni_evaulation_of_the_bangladesh_sustainability_compact_january_2016_final.pdf>  
149 ITUC, UNI Global Union and IndustriALL Global Union, ‘An Evaluation of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact’ (March 2015) 1.d 
<www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc-ia-uni_evaulation_of_the_bangladesh_sustainability_compact_march_final.pdf>.   
150 See note 120 above, p 1. 
151 See note 98 above, p 2. 
152 Ibid p 24. 
153 See note 131 above. 
154 See note 98 above, p 22.  
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remediation. Again, the EU has a role, as the lead development partner alongside the Member States, 
working also with the US and Canada, to assist. In total US$200 million has been pledged but more will 
be needed.155 The next period of remediation will be the true test because, without it, many workers 
will be at risk of injury or death on a daily basis, with the risk of fire remaining particularly acute.  
The third pillar of responsible business conduct (RBC) does not establish any commitments 
upon Bangladesh or the EU. It merely takes note of the private sector response to Rana Plaza and 
encourages its progression.156 Therefore, it places emphasis on the EU’s support for the Accord, the 
Alliance and further initiatives through RBC. The essence of the pillar is that Bangladesh and the EU 
remain ‘engaged to support and promote socially responsible supply chains’.157 It is not about the EU 
regulating these supply chains, but about supporting RBC.  
There are several points to note. Firstly, the EU, the ILO, and the international trade unions are 
highly critical of the inadequate progress made by Bangladesh towards adopting and implementing 
reforms of its labour law. Secondly, Bangladesh, the EU and the ILO welcome the efforts by major 
fashion and retail brands to improve safety in RMG factories. Thirdly, they support the Alliance, to a 
certain extent, but particularly the Accord, which is the optimum private initiative in partnership with 
global unions, national unions and other stakeholders.158 Fourthly, the EU and Bangladesh recognise 
the need for transnational enterprises/brands/retailers to deepen discussion on RBC and encourage 
retailers and brands to adopt and follow a unified code of conduct for factory audit. Fifthly, they are 
seeking to ensure a fuller role for the social partners in the RBC process. 
 
c. The Bangladesh Sustainability Compact as Global Experimental Governance 
Attributing features of GXG to the Compact acknowledges the variety of methods the EU, and other 
international actors, may utilise to pursue certain goals.159 The Compact illustrates the creativity of the 
Union in going beyond the hierarchical nature of the conventional ‘trade-labour linkage’. It is an 
unprecedented initiative tailored specifically to labour rights and factory safety in the Bangladeshi 
RMG industry with the value of sustainable development buttressing it. The Compact is not ‘hard law’ 
like the GSP, which remains as a back stop, but instead is a form of iterative soft law that builds on the 
strength of the EU-ILO relationship, illustrating the potential for future engagement in other partner 
countries based on the model it offers.  
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 The core tenets of GXG can be applied to the Compact. Firstly, there was an initial reflection 
and discussion among stakeholders with a broadly shared perception of a common problem.160 After 
the tragedy of Rana Plaza, international stakeholders involved in the RMG industry were reproached 
for their laxity in allowing labour rights violations to prevail. They were directed to repair their 
‘wrongs’. In a pressured environment, where consumers worldwide were pushing for change, 
international actors took different paths to achieving the objective of improving labour rights and 
factory safety. The US, as mentioned above, withdrew its GSP shortly after the disaster, although this 
was somewhat superficial as the RMG sector had not been given a tariff preference.161 Brands and 
retailers scrambled to conclude the Accord and the Alliance. The EU and the ILO emphasised the 
importance of ‘deep engagement’ in Bangladesh for all actors involved in the global value chain.162 The 
concept of ‘deep engagement’ was seized upon to quell uncertainty about whether the EU would 
initiate the GSP withdrawal procedure. Ultimately, the EU, concerned about the impact on workers on 
the ground, and with the support of the ILO and, to a qualified extent, the international trade unions, 
was not willing to withdraw the GSP tariff preferences granted to RMG exports from Bangladesh and 
chose to reject this path, at least for the immediate term.163  
 The broadly desired outcome, in theory, of the international community, was a shared 
endeavour to secure rapid improvement in labour rights and factory safety in Bangladesh.164 Although, 
it must be noted that a genuine desire to bring about such change was propelled by a combination of 
concerns including, inter alia, the loss of business, the political friction that ensued after Rana Plaza, 
and the sheer scale of the disaster. The predominant difficulty in pursuing such goals was that the 
actors did not know the best path to take,165 evident in large part from their diverse responses. It was 
a situation of strategic uncertainty that meant effective solutions to problems could only be defined 
by actually pursuing them.166 The EU understood that it was in a position both of leadership and of a 
certain special responsibility, as the principal recipient of Bangladesh’s RMG exports.167 Its emphasis 
on deep engagement manifested itself in a meeting, in July 2013, that brought together 
representatives from the industry, employers, trade unions and other key stakeholders to discuss the 
best mechanism with which to address the improvement of labour standards, factory safety and 
responsible business conduct in the industry.168 The outcome of this meeting was the Compact driven 
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by the EU in partnership with the ILO, and agreed to by the Government of Bangladesh, initially as a 
reactive rather than a proactive initiative.169 It manifested the paramount objective of all the actors 
involved to foster the continuous improvement of labour rights and factory safety so as to ensure that 
there would be no more Rana Plazas.170  
The establishment of the Compact in response to Rana Plaza adopted and merged together 
four different ‘pathways’ to a transnational experimentalist regime discussed by Zeitlin and 
Overdevest.171 First, private transnational initiatives were created in response to, in part, inaction by 
the Government on labour rights’ issues, regimes which were diffused throughout the RMG GVC. 
Second, the unilateral imposition of GSP conditions on labour rights moulded itself into a joint 
governance system with stakeholders from Bangladesh and the RMG industry. Third, the plethora of 
regimes imposing separate demands upon labour standards in Bangladesh were met by a need for 
coordination, and, fourth, there was a degree of benchmarking and comparison of different initiatives 
concluded post-Rana Plaza.172  
The Compact also meets the second tenet of GXG by operating as a framework with open-
ended goals.173 Linguistically, a ‘framework’ indicates the existence of a supporting or underlying 
structure.174 As such a framework, it does not set out how the signatory partners to the Compact 
should act, but rather acts as a support to their efforts. The Compact becomes the foundation to their 
deployed methods to achieve the overarching goal. This is particularly reflected by the lexicon used 
within the Compact, including ‘welcome the support’, ‘take note of the work’, ‘encourage’, ‘recognise’ 
and ‘consulting closely’. Thus, the EU’s actions and decisions are not imposed upon the Compact 
partners, it is instead about establishing and fostering a consistent and long-term relationship between 
them.175  
Furthermore, each of the three pillars of the Compact constitutes an open-ended goal: respect 
for labour rights; structural integrity of buildings and occupational health and safety; and RBC.176 It is 
under RBC that the nature of the Compact as a ‘framework’ is most evident. Here, the Compact 
partners support the coordination of RBC efforts by major fashion and retailer brands to improve 
safety in the Bangladeshi factories which supply them.177 By contrast, under the first two pillars, certain 
commitments are imposed upon the Government of Bangladesh. The EU also makes commitments 
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regarding its development cooperation priorities. Yet even these commitments do not belie the 
Compact’s flexible nature. The Compact acts as an overarching initiative with a cross-cutting 
coordinating mechanism,178 adding to the work of trade unions, industry, the ILO and the Government 
in finding solutions.179 It was not designed to be the EU ‘preaching from a lofty pedestal’ but ‘rather 
offering advice’.180 
 Addressing the third tenet of GXG, the implementation of the goals is left to ‘lower-level’ or 
contextually situated actors with knowledge of local conditions and the discretion to adapt the 
framework norms to the different contexts.181 The nature of the commitments and goals of the 
Compact endow the methods by which these goals can be met upon the partners. Much like the EU 
Member States, as ‘lower-level’ actors are given the freedom to pursue goals in conventional 
experimentalist governance, so the Compact partners, including the government, are given some 
flexibility in the way they pursue its goals.182 The EU’s most important partner in this respect is the 
Government, as it has the potential to ‘work the levers’ of law and policy in response to Rana Plaza.183 
 Genuine experimentalist governance in the field of trade and labour rights also necessarily 
demands engagement and cooperation with grassroots trade union and employer organisations. 
Indeed, experimentalist governance is founded within EU engagement with domestic civil society.184  
Accordingly, the Compact engages both the ILO and the international and industry-based social 
partners. Local civil society organisations are key to the monitoring and implementation of the 
Compact.185 These contextually-situated actors provide invaluable input. The social partners monitor 
and feedback on the situation on the ground, such as highlighting concerns relating to anti-union 
discrimination and violence.186 They have played a crucial role in drawing attention to human rights 
violations in the RMG industry.187 They also act as a pressure valve on the Government to improve 
labour rights and provide incentives for them to introduce regulatory reforms.188 The international 
trade unions are ‘watchdogs’ for international labour standards.189 Involving trade union organisations 
enables them to use their position to facilitate internal legitimisation within their domestic political 
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context.190 Particularly in Bangladesh, where there are significant concerns relating to the suppression 
of freedom of association and collective bargaining,191 enabling such legitimisation will empower and 
endow confidence on local trade unions and those who seek to form trade unions.192 
Table 1, below, takes note of the different initiatives operating under the framework of the 
Compact and reflects the nature of the Compact as a governance measure that permits the 
employment of differing means to the same general ends.193 It is clear from Table 1 that each initiative 
adopts different means and involves different actors. The diverse pathways to an experimentalist 
regime converge on a multi-level, multi-actor governance architecture represented by the Compact 
which dissolves the distinctions between these actors.194 While the NTPA is a national initiative, 
focusing on bringing together organisations within Bangladesh, the Better Work Bangladesh 
programme takes a more international outlook drawing upon the Compact partners, including the EU, 
ILO and IFC. Similarly, the Accord involves both global trade unions and global NGOs, whereas the 
Alliance does not. Contrasting means of obtaining the general objectives of the Compact are adopted, 
depending largely upon the form of initiative. The Accord and Alliance are both RBC, private sector 
initiatives, the NTPA is a government initiative, and the Better Work Bangladesh programme is an ILO-
IFC initiative. As such, they entail different methods. The Accord is a legally binding agreement which 
engages with workers through committees, and factory safety through an inspection programme and 
enforcement system. The Alliance, however, is not a legally binding agreement. It adopts factory safety 
assessments and a helpline, rather basic in comparison to the Accord. The NTPA focuses on national 
law and policies, alongside factory inspections. The Better Work initiative promotes, in line with the 
ILO’s involvement, compliance with international labour standards and national labour law. The 
Compact provides space for ‘mutual readjustment, learning from experience, and increased 
accountability of schemes to one another and to external audiences’.195 
Table 1 - Bangladesh Sustainability Compact 
 General Objective: Improving labour rights and factory safety in Bangladesh 
Initiative ACCORD ALLIANCE NTPA BETTER WORK 
BANGLADESH 
Form of 
Initiative 
CSR Initiative CSR Initiative Government Initiative ILO and IFC Initiative 
Actors 
Involved 
More than 200 
international clothing 
brands and retailers, 
factory owners, trade 
unions: IndustriALL 
and UNI-Global, and 
NGOs including the 
North American 
retailers and brands, 
including Wal-Mart, 
Gap and Target. 
Government, national 
worker and employer 
organisations. 
ILO, IFC, national trade 
unions and employer 
organisations, Compact 
partners. 
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Clean Clothes 
Campaign 
Means 
Adopted 
Legally binding 
agreement to work 
towards a safe and 
healthy RMG 
industry. It has a 
Steering Committee, 
an independent 
inspection 
programme, health 
and safety 
committees and 
enforcement. 
Factory safety 
assessments, helpline 
for workers to 
anonymously report 
safety concerns and 
labour issues. 
Focus on legislation and 
policy, administration 
including improving the 
factory inspectorate 
programme and practical 
activities including factory 
level fire safety needs’ 
assessments and a fire 
safety risk hotline for 
workers. 
Personal action plans, 
factory assessments, 
promotes compliance 
with international labour 
standards and national 
law, provides, inter alia, 
advisory services, creates 
factory improvement 
plans and establishes 
Worker Participation 
Committees. 
 
An additional feature of GXG, found in the Compact, is the process of continuous feedback with 
frequent reporting, monitoring and peer review.196 This is a key element as the Compact is an 
overarching initiative that coordinates the different public and private actions required to fulfil its 
goals. Peer review is undertaken by the engagement of all Compact partners. There is strict follow up, 
in the form of meetings and technical status reports, of progress under each of the pillars and 
commitments undertaken by Bangladesh, the EU, the ILO, and the private actors.197 In the follow-up 
meetings, the Compact partners discuss the progress of implementation and the importance of 
working together to draw upon lessons learned towards the improvement of working conditions in the 
RMG industry in similar conditions elsewhere. There is also a high-level ‘3+5+1’ group at the local level, 
involving contextually relevant actors, the Government and ambassadors of Compact partners, which 
regularly reviews the progress of the Compact. Inevitably, this peer review process has given NGOs 
and international trade unions the opportunity to comment on the initiatives concluded under the 
remit of the Compact. For example, global trade unions provide data and analysis to the local high level 
‘3+5+1 group’ to assist with the monitoring of the Compact.198 
 Technical status reports published by the Commission provide transparency to supervision. 
They build upon information from several sources, including additional meetings with, and reports 
published by, actors from the private sector and civil society, including the International Trade Union 
Confederation and Human Rights Watch.199 These actors are key to engaging in peer review, 
particularly apparent in the criticism that has arisen over the effectiveness of the RBC initiatives 
concerning factory inspection and remediation. Contrasting levels of progress between the initiatives 
have been made transparent as a result of such review. For example, the Government-led NTPA 
immediately declared 80% of factories under its scope safe, raising concerns about the seriousness 
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with which Bangladesh treats its obligations and also corruption, whereas the private sector Accord 
and Alliance initiatives both found safety issues with every factory they inspected.200 Global NGOs are 
keen to draw upon the Accord because of the unprecedented role it endows upon trade unions.201 The 
private sector has, moreover, been particularly proactive in engaging in peer review. There is a regular 
forum meeting bringing together all interested brands and retailers to discuss issues related to RBC,202 
and a data sharing facility.203 The comparisons drawn upon in these meetings generate assessments of 
the success of the initiatives, which in turn feeds into public accountability, recursive learning and 
external pressure for improvement, particularly by NGOs both within Bangladesh and worldwide.204 
 Finally, the Compact’s goals and practices must be periodically and routinely re-evaluated and 
where possible revised.205 This can be recognised throughout the four years of the Compact to date. 
The engagement of more partners, such as Canada, reflects the nature of the Compact as a form of 
‘continuing engagement’ or continually improving engagement. It is unquestionable that the addition 
of new partners will strengthen it, enabling greater support and funding to delve into, for example, 
ongoing issues such as skills development, combating gender discrimination and more effective factory 
remediation. Likewise, the transformation of the Compact as an initiative monitored primarily by civil 
society provides focused pursuit of its goals. 
 The Compact’s goals are not set in stone and have been revised over time. Priority areas have 
been reviewed parallel to what the Bangladeshi context demands. For example, the identification of 
difficulties with trade union registration, particularly the fact that the rate of registration approvals has 
slowed down,206 has led to a focus on the need to ensure that the registration process is carried out 
freely without interference by the Government or industry.207 The work of the ILO Committee on the 
Application of Standards has highlighted further concerns regarding the lack of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining rights,208 whereupon follow up actions have been recommended under the 
Compact and are being monitored.209 The ILO’s actions and decisions provide the reference point for 
the EU in its commitment to maintaining the Compact experiment. 
 The practices of the initiatives covered under the Compact have also been revised, through a 
process of deep engagement, most particularly on how to draw upon the different means adopted 
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under the key initiatives and facilitating the understanding of how a variety of actors can work together 
to bring about change. 
 On the overarching level, the factory inspection systems under the Accord, Alliance and NTPA 
were re-aligned as a result of fragmentation caused by the different means adopted for factory 
inspections. An agreement was reached between all stakeholders carrying out inspections advocating 
a common reporting format.210 In addition, owing to the disassociated nature of publications of 
inspection reports, in March 2014 summary reports from the three initiatives began to be published 
on the dife.gov.bd website, containing information as to factory names, addresses, owner names, 
numbers of workers and inspections completed.211 As of April 2015, it contained information on 3,743 
factories,212 a major achievement for transparency. 
 Change has also been facilitated through the Compact whereby pressure placed on the 
Government by Compact partners has led to improvements in labour laws. For example, a 2015 update 
of implementing rules for the Bangladesh Labour Act facilitated a piloting programme under the 
Accord of training and safety committees.213 The pilot of this programme has since engaged, as of 
March 2017, around 500,000 participants in ‘All Employee Meetings’ and around 1,500 in Safety 
Committee training programmes.214 In addition, new practices have been adopted by the Government. 
In May 2015, a hotline was established by the Department of Labour with ILO support to receive 
grievances from workers and management in RMG and other sectors.215 As of July 2016, it received 
6,159 calls.216 The establishment of this hotline mirrors the establishment of a hotline under the 
Alliance. There were 21,010 calls recorded under the Alliance helpline by September 2015.217 This 
hotline has since been listed as one of the Compact’s key achievements under the first pillar. 
 Perhaps the most successful aspect of the Compact is that where problems on the ground have 
been identified, these have been addressed by the partners. The Compact thus provides a visible 
platform for engagement. For example, in response to the heightened difficulty obtaining registered 
trade union status, the ILO conducted workshops bringing together trade unions and employer 
organisations educating workers on how to make online applications and appeal against application 
rejections.218 With the backing of the Compact partners and the ILO, this placed increasing pressure on 
the Government to address difficulties regarding trade union registrations.  
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Efforts to improve factory safety have resulted in varying degrees of commitments by Compact 
partners. The weaknesses of the NTPA were identified and addressed by the injection of a US $31.4 
million, three and a half year ILO programme funded by Canada, the Netherlands and the UK.219 The 
ILO developed hundreds of Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) for NTPA factories in the remediation 
stage.220 With regards to difficulties obtaining funding for remediation, development partners 
including the EU pledged US $200 million,221 the US having also pledged funding to strengthen 
Bangladesh’s inspectorate process through increasing the number of inspectors.222 It has only been 
through extensive peer review and monitoring, and a shared commitment from the partners, that 
these weaknesses have been able to be addressed and quickly acted upon. 
 A further feature of the Compact that aligns itself with GXG is the existence of a ‘penalty 
default’. Indeed, experimentalist governance does not preclude the existence of binding legal 
obligations or sanctions for aspects of non-engagement.223 This supports the ‘hybridity thesis’ which 
approaches the co-existence of law and ‘experimentalist governance’.224 It affiliates with the 
hypothesis that this coexistence can produce a fruitful outcome. As part of this co-existence, ‘default 
hybridity’, governance ‘in the shadow of the law’ is applicable to the Compact. Hard law is the default 
regime which can be applied where there has been a lack of engagement in experimentalist 
governance. Such a default position is potentially severe in its consequences, and is designed to be an 
‘action-forcing’ regime.225 GXG is deemed to be unsuccessful where it is impossible to have the 
existence of this penalty default.226 The penalty default underpinning the Compact is the possibility of 
GSP tariff preference withdrawal. The Compact is thus a novel form of regulation that can interact with 
negative conditionality.  
However, tariff preference withdrawal is not such a strong ‘penalty default’. The Commission 
shows a policy preference for cooperation over sanctions, and sanctions in the form of tariff preference 
withdrawal have rarely been enacted by the EU.227 Negative conditionality may no longer be 
considered a credible threat underpinning the Compact. This has led to calls for the EU to use its power 
and leverage more fully to influence the improvement of labour rights and factory safety.228 Even in 
the light of ongoing labour rights’ violations in Bangladesh, the EU remains cautious about moving to 
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a default scenario.229 Nevertheless, global civil society continues to push for consideration of this 
option. NGOs have highlighted how each year since Rana Plaza the Government of Bangladesh has 
failed to meet its commitments, affirmed by the ILO supervisory machinery.230 At the 2016 
International Labour Conference, the ILO  Committee on the Application of Standards inserted a special 
paragraph into its report, noting ‘with deep concern that the Government has failed to make progress 
on the repeated and consistent conclusions of this Committee’.231 It urged the government to 
undertake several actions, including amending the 2013 Labour Act, investigating acts of anti-union 
discrimination and ensuring the appropriate procedures are in place for union registrations.232  
Global trade unions are confident that the initiation of an investigation process is the 
appropriate path for the EU to take.233 They consider that it is time for the EU to take a bolder position 
and steps to determine whether a partial suspension of trade preferences is in order.234 Despite this, 
the EU still has not undertaken a GSP investigation, arguing for more dialogue, which global trade 
unions view not in itself as problematic, but conclude that ‘the manner in which the EU has conducted 
dialogue has been ineffective given that the situation has only worsened substantially over the last 
several years’.235 In March 2017, as progress stalled on the actions recommended by the ILO, it was 
reported that the Commission sent a joint letter to the Ambassador of Bangladesh in Brussels warning 
that key labour reforms had to be undertaken or it risked temporary withdrawal of trade 
preferences.236 Certainly, the process of peer review of the EU’s actions by trade unions, NGOs and the 
ILO, with regard to the lack of imposition of the ‘penalty default’ has played a particularly important 
role under the Compact. In one of the rare instances that GSP withdrawal has occurred, in Myanmar, 
it was the trade union organisations, utilising their leverage within the ILO, that acted as the conduit 
for GSP withdrawal.237  Trade union organisations in response to Rana Plaza, on the other hand, 
advocated at first the softer approach of the Compact. Now their position as Compact partners has 
endowed them with greater ongoing influence in the process of GXG. 
This weakness in invoking the ‘penalty default’ scenario is that it provides less incentive for the 
employers and Government to engage.238 Staying engaged in the Compact should not be 
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underestimated, and it is important to enable lasting improvements, as opposed to a short-term 
solution.239 The Compact may have been a reactive initiative, at the point of its inception, but it seeks 
to establish long-term proactive engagement. Deep engagement, after all, is about investment and 
cooperation between many actors in a rigorous process of review to attain improvements across the 
three pillars.240 This is an optimistic objective, and the road to attaining the goal will not automatically 
foster improvements in labour rights. Experiments rarely guarantee success, and usually encompass 
many ‘tests’ prior to drawing any scientific conclusion.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Compact, as a method of GXG, has evolved as a proactive initiative addressing some of the 
negative consequences of globalisation for RMG workers in Bangladesh.241 The speed with which it 
was concluded after Rana Plaza shows that it was the result of a great deal of international stakeholder 
pressure. One might, therefore, regard the Compact as test case for future initiatives that may be 
concluded by the EU, in conjunction with the ILO, to pre-empt rather than react to crises in safety and 
violations of labour rights in specific sectors in partner countries, particularly when identified by civil 
society as requiring multi-level intervention.  
 The benefits of taking an approach of GXG towards achieving broad labour-related and societal 
goals are numerous. It is designed to foster participatory, deliberative, locally informed and adaptive 
problem solving,242 features which have notably constituted the Compact. Ensuring a non-hierarchical 
method of governance, it also allows for the engagement of a variety of international actors and the 
creation of new partnerships.243 This is clear within the Compact’s multi-level governance method. It 
has engaged the key States, international organisations and domestic actors within its remit, 
facilitating the sentiment of investment in the Compact by many.244 Cooperation between the partners 
has been a vital element to its progress, reflecting a concept of engagement that has depth, seeking 
to go beyond scratching the surface of labour rights’ violations.245 It has become a holistic and a 
heuristic approach to the promotion of labour rights, necessary for the Compact to be a normatively 
sustainable mechanism.246 Experimentalist governance has also allowed for tailored solutions to the 
specific problem of addressing complex labour rights’ issues in the Bangladeshi RMG sector.247 It has 
become clear that GXG within the Compact has been useful as a versatile instrument for pursuing the 
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EU’s intertwined human rights, trade and sustainable development objectives in partnership with local 
actors. Commitment to the Compact remains relatively strong, and there have been some tangible 
improvements, such as completed factory inspections and limited strengthening of labour 
legislation,248 promoted by its unique governance-based approach to fostering labour rights.249  
 However, there is much that remains to be done. As already ascertained, the engagement of 
the actors is decreasing. The Bangladesh Government, upon whom most of the obligations for 
‘continuous improvement’ are placed, has not shown much support for the Compact’s objectives and 
its engagement is intermittent at best. Trade union organisations, for example, highlight concerns 
relating to the attitude of Government representatives ‘away from the spotlight’.250 Serious violations 
of labour rights remain.251 There is a need to improve respect for trade union rights, ensure that labour 
legislation meets ILO requirements and that issues regarding sexual harassment and abuses of child 
labour are dealt with.252 Inspections of factories must always be followed up with effective 
remediation.253 To guarantee the success of the Compact, in meeting its goals, it is important that 
ongoing pressure is maintained on the Government and the initiative, which is not formally time-
limited, must not diminish in influence or importance.254 
GXG, much like elements of experimentalist governance within the EU’s internal agenda, when 
transcribed to the EU’s external relations, offers a silver lining amongst the dark clouds created by pure 
sanctions-based EU approaches.255 GXG may be the fundamental rethinking that is needed in the field 
of EU trade and labour rights.256 Previously, in Bangladesh, the EU had a laissez-faire approach to 
labour rights knowing that it had the option of imposing trade sanctions if intervention was necessary. 
As a result, it was detached from the situation on the ground. Now, through continuous multi-level 
engagement, and strong international partnership, it is able, with the ILO, to shape progress towards 
the fulfilment of shared objectives while maintaining at least the underpinning of penalty default, 
however much of a chimera it may seem in practice.257 Indeed, even where there are doubts as to the 
Compact’s effectiveness, the creativity of the Union in designing, with the ILO and other actors, the 
unique partnership that it has fostered offers promise for future GXG initiatives focused on delivering 
sustainable development objectives and strong adherence by States and private actors to international 
human rights’ standards. 
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